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Abstract

Optimistic fair exchange (OFE) is a kind of protocol that solves the fair exchange problem with the help of a
trusted third party, usually referred to as an arbitrator. Participation of the arbitrator is required only when
there is a dispute amongst the exchanging parties. Thus, the majority of the executions of the exchange does
not involve the arbitrator and hence the term optimistic. The passive nature of the arbitrator makes optimistic
fair exchange a desirable tool in applications such as contract signing and electronic commerce. The highest
level of security of optimistic fair exchange in the literature is the multi-user security in the chosen-key model,
proposed by Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo in CT-RSA 2008. They showed that an efficient optimistic fair
exchange scheme secure in this sense can be constructed generically from a conventional digital signature and
a two-party ring signature. In particular, the underlying ring signature is required to be unforgeable under an
adaptive attack, against a static adversary in the 2-user setting. In this paper we propose a new security model
for two-party ring signatures called unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks and demonstrate that our
new model is strictly weaker than the model of unforgeable under an adaptive attack, against a static adversary
in the 2-user setting. We make an observation that two-party ring signatures secure in this weaker model will
suffice to guarantee the security of the resulting OFE scheme following the aforementioned generic
construction. Based on this observation, more efficient OFE schemes secure in the standard model can be
constructed. Specifically, we prove that the wellknown Bender, Katz and Morselli's 2-user ring signature is
secure in our weakened model. Based on this two-party ring signature, we construct an OFE secure in the
chosen-key model offering multi-user security in the standard model under the Computational DiffieHellman assumption. The assumption is arguably weaker than those used in all existing constructions, which
rely on the random oracle model, decisional assumptions or the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumptions. It is also
worth noting that our scheme is the most efficient one in the standard model, and offers comparable efficiency
against those secure under the random oracle model.
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Revisiting Optimistic Fair Exchange based on Ring
Signatures
Yang Wang, Man Ho Au, Member, IEEE and Willy Susilo∗¶ , Senior member, IEEE

Abstract—Optimistic fair exchange (OFE) is a kind of protocol
that solves the fair exchange problem with the help of a trusted
third party, usually referred to as an arbitrator. Participation of
the arbitrator is required only when there is a dispute amongst
the exchanging parties. Thus, the majority of the executions of
the exchange does not involve the arbitrator and hence the term
optimistic. The passive nature of the arbitrator makes optimistic
fair exchange a desirable tool in applications such as contract
signing and electronic commerce. The highest level of security of
optimistic fair exchange in the literature is the multi-user security
in the chosen-key model, proposed by Huang, Yang, Wong and
Susilo in CT-RSA 2008. They showed that an efficient optimistic
fair exchange scheme secure in this sense can be constructed
generically from a conventional digital signature and a two-party
ring signature. In particular, the underlying ring signature is
required to be unforgeable under an adaptive attack, against a
static adversary in the 2-user setting.
In this paper we propose a new security model for two-party
ring signatures called unforgeability against restricted adaptive
attacks and demonstrate that our new model is strictly weaker
than the model of unforgeable under an adaptive attack, against
a static adversary in the 2-user setting. We make an observation
that two-party ring signatures secure in this weaker model will
suffice to guarantee the security of the resulting OFE scheme
following the aforementioned generic construction. Based on this
observation, more efficient OFE schemes secure in the standard
model can be constructed. Specifically, we prove that the wellknown Bender, Katz and Morselli’s 2-user ring signature is
secure in our weakened model. Based on this two-party ring
signature, we construct an OFE secure in the chosen-key model
offering multi-user security in the standard model under the
Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. The assumption is
arguably weaker than those used in all existing constructions,
which rely on the random oracle model, decisional assumptions
or the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumptions. It is also worth noting
that our scheme is the most efficient one in the standard model,
and offers comparable efficiency against those secure under the
random oracle model.

Keywords: optimistic fair exchange, generic construction, two
party ring signatures, restricted adaptive attacks
I. I NTRODUCTION

N

OWADAYS more business is conducted over the Internet, and electronic commerce grows rapidly. Thus fair
exchange, i.e., how to make mutually distrustful participants
exchange digital items oven open networks in a fair way,
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attracts a lot of interest from the research community. An
exchange is said to be fair if at the end of the exchange process,
either each participant receives the other’s digital item, or
neither participant does.
Traditionally, many digital items such as electronic checks
and electronic airline tickets are implemented as digital signatures. Thus, in a fair exchange protocol, it is normally assumed
that at least one of the digital items being exchanged is a
signature on some message.
Optimistic fair exchange (OFE), introduced by Asokan,
Schunter and Waidner [1] in 1997, is a kind of protocol to
solve the fair exchange problem. An optimistic fair exchange
protocol comprises signers, verifiers, and a trusted third party
named “arbitrator”. In such a protocol, Alice the signer first
delivers a partial signature to Bob the verifier. A valid partial
signature serves as a partial commitment from Alice about the
exchange to take place and assures Bob that he will receive
Alice’s full signature at the end of the protocol. The assurance
follows from the fact that the arbitrator is capable of converting
the partial signature into a full one. After verifying the validity
of the partial signature, Bob fulfills his obligation by delivering
his digital item to Alice, after which Alice should send her full
signature to complete the exchange. Note that under normal
circumstances, the arbitrator does not need to be involved at
all. In the case Alice refuses to send her full signature or
there is a network failure, Bob shows the evidence of fulfilling
his obligation and asks the arbitrator to make a resolution, in
which the arbitrator converts the partial signature into a full
one and sends it back to Bob.
As a useful tool in applications such as electronic commerce, optimistic fair exchange has been extensively researched [2]–[12] since its introduction. Traditionally, two
popular approaches for constructing non-interactive optimistic
fair exchange schemes are adopted, namely, verifiably encrypted signatures-based constructions [7], [8], [10], [13]–[15]
and sequential two-party multisignatures-based constructions
[4]. Most proposed OFE schemes are proven secure in the
random oracle model [16], in which a hash function is treated
as a random function and all users have oracle access to
this random function. A proof in the random oracle model
is heuristic, because such a proof may not guarantee the
security when the random oracle is replaced by a concrete
hash function [17].
Formally defining the security model for optimistic fair
exchange turns out to be a gradual process. Security of early
optimistic fair exchange protocols is studied in the singleuser setting, in which an adversary is only allowed to issue
the resolution queries with respect to the challenge signer.
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Due to the reality that many signers may share the same
arbitrator, in 2007, Dodis, Lee and Yum [18] considered optimistic fair exchange in the multi-user setting and registeredkey model [19], where an adversary is allowed to make the
resolution queries with respect to any correctly generated
public keys. This naturally captures the case that dishonest
users may collude to cheat another user. Dodis, Lee and Yum
showed that the single-user security of optimistic fair exchange
does not guarantee multi-user security [18].
In 2008, Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo [20] studied the
security of optimistic fair exchange in the multi-user setting
and chosen-key model, where an adversary can make the
resolution queries even with respect to adversarially chosen
public keys which may not be generated correctly. More
specifically, the registered-key model assumes the authenticity
of public keys and each user in the system should demonstrate
its knowledge of the corresponding secret key in the public
key registration stage and thus disallow various kinds of key
substitution attack. However, the chosen-key model allows
a user to select arbitrary public keys without the need to
demonstrate its knowledge of the corresponding secret key.
The chosen-key model is more practical, as in the public key
infrastructure a user is not required to show its knowledge of
the secret key when applying a certificate of its public key
from a certification authority. They demonstrated, through an
example, that an optimistic fair exchange scheme provably
secure in the registered-key model may not be secure in the
chosen-key model.
Since the multi-user setting and chosen-key model guarantees strong security, it would be desirable if an optimistic
fair exchange scheme were secure under this model. Before
the proposal of this model, previous OFE schemes based
on verifiably encrypted signatures are known to be secure
only in the single user setting or in the registered-key model.
Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo [20] showed that the popular
paradigm of building OFE schemes from verifiably encrypted
signatures can still yield schemes secure in the multi-user
setting and chosen-key model if the encryption of the signature
is secure against chosen ciphertext attack and that the proof
of correctness is one-time simulation-sound. They argue that
in the standard model, these two requirements are expensive
to achieve and thus the resulting scheme from this paradigm
is not efficient.
They proposed a new construction paradigm of OFE. Their
construction is based on conventional signatures [21] and ring
signatures [22]. They showed that the ring signature did not
need to satisfy the highest level of existential unforgeability
considered in [23], namely unforgeability with respect to
insider corruption. Instead, unforgeability under an adaptive
attack, against a static adversary [24] in the 2-user setting will
suffice. Since there already exist a number of efficient conventional signatures and ring signatures that are secure without
random oracles, efficient OFE schemes whose security does
not rely on random oracles can be built by following Huang
et al.’s generic construction. In fact, they also demonstrated
the flexibility of their generic construction and discussed three
efficient OFE instantiations without random oracles.

A. Our contributions
Our contributions comprise three aspects. Firstly, we propose a new security model for 2-user ring signatures, which
is named “unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks”,
and compare it with the existing model unforgeability under
an adaptive attack, against a static adversary in the 2-user
setting. We separate these two models by presenting a concrete
ring signature scheme, and show that our new model is strictly
weaker. This means that any ring signature that is unforgeable
under an adaptive attack, against a static adversary will also
be unforgeable in our new model, but the converse may not
be true.
Next, we revisit Huang et al.’s generic construction of OFE
schemes from conventional signatures and ring signatures,
and prove that a ring signature secure in our new model
would suffice to guarantee the resulting OFE scheme’s security
in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model, rather than
the previous understanding that the ring signature should
be unforgeable under an adaptive attack, against a static
adversary. This observation can provide us with alternatives
for the ring signatures to be adopted in the OFE construction.
Finally, to demonstrate the impact of our observation, we
offer a concrete OFE instantiation based on a ring signature
scheme that is only secure in our weaker model, i.e., unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks. This concrete
OFE instantiation is the most efficient OFE scheme secure in
the standard model in terms of signature size, generation as
well as verification. Also, our OFE instantiation relies on a
weak assumption, namely, the computational Diffie-Hellman
assumption.
II. P RELIMINARIES
A. Complexity Assumption
We review a well-established complexity assumption, the
computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption [25].
Definition 1: (Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption).
Let G be a cyclic group with generator g of prime order p ≥
2k , where k is a security parameter. Given (g, A = g a , B =
g b ) where a, b are uniformly chosen at random from ZZp , we
say that the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption
holds for G if for every probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary A, the advantage of A in computing g ab ,
AdvA (k) = Pr[A(g, A, B) = g ab ]
is negligible in k.
B. Digital signatures
SYNTAX. A signature scheme Sig comprises three efficient
algorithms: SIG = (KG, Sig, Ver). The key generation
algorithm KG takes as input a security parameter 1k and
outputs a signing key sk and a verification key vk. The signing
algorithm Sig takes as input a signing key sk and a message m
from the associated message space M, and outputs a signature
σ ← Sig(sk, m). The verification algorithm Ver takes as
input a message m, a signature σ and a verification key pk
and outputs either > indicating valid or ⊥ indicating invalid.
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We require that Ver(m, Sig(sk, m), vk) = >, for any m ∈ M.
SECURITY. We consider a standard security notion for
signature schemes: existential unforgeability under adaptive
chosen message attacks [21], denoted by UF-CMA. Intuitively,
this notion requires that an adversary is not able to generate
a signature on a new message under the challenge public key.
We define the adversary A’s advantage AdvUF-CMA
SIG,A (k) as

(sk, vk) ← SIG.KG(1k ),
Pr SIG.Ver(m, σ, vk) = > (m, σ) ← AOSig (·) (vk),  ,
m 6∈ Query(A, OSig (·))


where A is allowed to make a sequence of queries to the
signing oracle OSig (·), and Query(A, OSig (·)) is the set of
queries made by A to oracle OSig (·). SIG is said to be
UF-CMA
UF-CMA-secure, if the advantage function AdvSIG,A
(k) is
negligible in k for any PPT adversary A.
In this paper, we follow the terminology used in [20] and
refer to the signature schemes reviewed above as conventional
signature schemes to distinguish them from ring signature
schemes. Besides, we denote the signatures generated by a
conventional signature scheme as conventional signatures.
C. Ring signatures
SYNTAX. A ring signature scheme RS comprises three
efficient algorithms: RS = (KG, Sig, Ver). The key generation
algorithm KG takes as input a security parameter 1k and
outputs a public verification key pk and a private signing key
sk. The signing algorithm Sig takes as input a signing key
sk, a message m from the associated message space M and
a set of public keys R := {pki }li=1 such that pk ∈ R where
(sk, pk) is a key pair outputted by KG(1k ), and outputs a ring
signature σ ← Sig(sk, m, R). The verification algorithm Ver
takes as input a message m, a ring signature σ and a list of
public keys R := {pki }li=1 , and outputs > or ⊥ for accept or
reject. We require that Ver(m, Sig(sk, m, R), R) = >, for
any m ∈ M.
A 2-user ring signature scheme is a specific case of the
above that only supports rings R for which |R| = 2.
SECURITY. Two security properties that a ring signature
scheme should satisfy are anonymity and unforgeability. Intuitively, anonymity requires that no one should be able to
determine which number of a ring has actually generated the
signature, and unforgeability requires that no one should be
able to generate a ring signature if none of the ring members’
private keys is known.
In Huang et al’s construction of OFE, a fundamental level of
anonymity, the basic anonymity [23], is sufficient. We review
it here.
n(k)
1) Key pairs {pki , ski }i=1 are generated by RS.KG(1k ),
n(k)
and the set of public keys R := {pki }i=1 is given to
an adversary A.
2) A is provided with a ring signing oracle OSign(·, ·, ·),
where OSign(s, m, S) outputs RS.Sig(sks , m, S), and
we require that S ⊂ R and pks ∈ S.

3) A submits (m∗ , i0 , i1 , R∗ ) where R∗ ⊂ R, pki0 , pki1 ∈
R∗ . A random bit b is chosen and A is given the
challenge ring signature σ ∗ ← RS.Sig(skib , m∗ , R∗ ).
4) A outputs a bit b0 and succeeds if b0 = b.
A ring signature scheme is said to achieve basic anonymity
if no adversary wins the above experiment with probability
non-negligibly greater than 1/2.
For the security level of unforgeability, they consider the
model unforgeability under an adaptive attack, against a static
adversary in the 2-user setting [24]. It is defined as follows.
(sk0 , pk0 )

←

RS.KG(1k )

(sk1 , pk1 )

←

RS.KG(1k )

R

:= {pk0 , pk1 }

AORS.Sig (R)


RS.Ver(m, σ, R) = >
success of A :=
∧
(·, m, R) 6∈ Query(A, ORS.Sig )
where A is a PPT adversary, ORS.Sig is the ring signing
oracle which takes as input an index i ∈ {0, 1}, a message
m, a 2-user ring S where pki ∈ S, and outputs a ring
signature σ on message m under the ring S using the signing
key ski , and Query(A, ORS.Sig ) is the set of ring signature
queries issued by A. A ring signature scheme is said to be
(existentially) unforgeable under an adaptive attack, against a
static adversary in the 2-user setting if no adversary wins the
experiment with non-negligible probability.
(m, σ)

←

III. A N EW M ODEL FOR 2-U SER R ING S IGNATURES
We now define a new security model named “unforgeability
against restricted adaptive attacks” for 2-user ring signatures,
and then show it is strictly weaker than the model Huang et al.
considered in [20] and reviewed above. Consider the following
experiment.
(sk0 , pk0 )

←

RS.KG(1k )

(sk1 , pk1 )

←

RS.KG(1k )

R
(m, σ)
success of A

:= {pk0 , pk1 }
0

AORS.Sig (R)


RS.Ver(m, σ, R) = >
:=
∧
0
(m, {·, pk1 }) 6∈ Query(A, ORS.Sig
)
←

0
where A is a PPT adversary, ORS.Sig
is the ring signing oracle
which takes as input a message m, a 2-user ring S where
pk1 ∈ S, and outputs a ring signature σ on message m under
the ring S using the signing key sk1 , and Query(A, ORS.Sig )
is the set of ring signature queries issued by A. By “restricted
adaptive”, we mean that the adversary can adaptively choose
a public key pk where pk 6= pk1 and makes queries to the
ring signing oracle with respect to the ring {pk, pk1 }, but the
adversary is prohibited from making queries with respect to
the ring {pk, pk0 }. Besides, the adversary is not allowed to
make a query on the challenge message with respect to any
ring (however, in the model considered by Huang et al., the
adversary can make queries on the challenge message with
respect to any 2-user ring S such that S 6= R and S∩R 6= ∅). A
ring signature scheme is said to be (existentially) unforgeable
against restricted adaptive attacks if there is no adversary wins
the experiment with non-negligible probability.
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A. Separating Adaptive Model from Restricted Adaptive
Model
In the following, we give a concrete example for showing
that a 2-user ring signature scheme secure in our restricted
adaptive model may not be secure in the adaptive model
considered by Huang et al. The instantiation is a simple
modification of Bender, Katz and Morselli’s 2-user ring signature scheme [23]. More specifically, in Bender, Katz and
Morselli’s 2-user ring signature scheme, each user chooses
his own Waters hash generators [26]. In our example, all users
share the same Waters hash generators. The modified 2-user
ring signature scheme RS = (KG, Sig, Ver) is as follows.
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, g be
a generator of G, and e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing
where GT is a multiplicative group of order p. Let further
u0 , u1 , u2 , · · · , un ← G be the Waters hash generators that are
uniformly and independently chosen at random from G. Let
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a collision-resistant hash function.
We assume the public parameter (G, g, p, e, H, u0 , u1 , · · · , un )
is shared by all users.
RS.KG : Choose a random exponent α ∈ ZZp ; set pk = g α
and sk = α.
RS.Sig(sk, M, R) : To sign a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ with
respect to the ring R = {pk, pk 0 } where sk = α is the
corresponding secret key of pk, proceed as follows: compute
(m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H(M ), where mi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1 to n,
and choose random r ← ZZp . The ring signature σ is set as
S1 = (pk 0 )α · (u0

n
Y

m

uj j )r , and S2 = g r .

j=1

RS.Ver(M, σ, R) : To verify the signature (S1 , S2 ) on message M with respect to the ring R = {pk, pk 0 }, compute
(m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H(M ) and check whether
e(pk, pk 0 ) = e(S1 , g) · e(S2−1 , u0

n
Y

m

uj j ).

j=1

Bender, Katz and Morselli [23] proved that their ring
signature scheme is unconditionally anonymous against full
key exposure, the highest level of anonymity considered in
[23]. They also showed that their ring signature scheme is
unforgeable against chosen-subring attacks, in which the adversary is not allowed to making signing queries with respect
to a ring containing adversarially-generated public keys.
On the other hand, the same scheme is known to be insecure
in the adaptive model as shown in [27]. The adaptive attack
described in [27] is also applicable to the modified version
presented above. Indeed, to generate a signature on message
M ∈ {0, 1}∗ with respect to the ring R = {pk, pk 0 } where
sk = α is the corresponding secret key of pk, an adversary
¯ = (pk 0 )s , and
randomly chooses s ∈ ZZp , sets a public key pk
asks the signing oracle to generate a signature on message M
¯ Let (m1 , · · · , mn ) ←
with respect to the ring R0 = {pk, pk}.
H(M ), the signature with respect to the ring R0 will be
¯ α · (u0
S1 = pk

n
Y
j=1

m

uj j )r , and S2 = g r .

1/s

1/s

Therefore (S1 , S2 ) will be a ring signature with respect to
the ring R on message M .
It is easy to see that the above instantiation of ring signature
scheme is unconditionally anonymous against full key exposure, as the only value (pk 0 )α (where pk = g α ) is needed to
sign, and either of the two users can compute this value.
Next, we show that the above instantiation of ring signature
scheme is in fact secure in our unforgeability model, i.e.,
unforgeable under a restricted adaptive attack.
Theorem 1: The 2-user ring signature scheme above is
unforgeable against restricted adaptive attacks if the CDH
assumption holds in G.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A breaks the unforgeability under
a restricted adaptive attack. We show how to construct an
algorithm B that produces a solution for a CDH instance.
This will contradict with the CDH assumption. Let the CDH
instance be (G, p, g, A = g a , B = g b ). Let q be the number
of different messages contained in the queries A has made to
the ring signing oracles.
At the start, the simulator sets an integer, l = 4q, and
chooses uniformly at random an integer, k ∗ between 0 and
n. It then chooses an n-length vector, ~x = (xi ), where
the elements of ~x are chosen uniformly at random between
0 and l − 1 and a value, x0 , chosen uniformly at random
between 0 and l − 1. Besides, the simulator chooses a random
y 0 ∈ ZZp and an n-length vector, ~y = (yi ), where the
elements of ~y are chosen at random in ZZp . The simulator
keeps these values private. let e : G × G → GT be a bilinear
pairing where GT is a multiplicative group of order p and
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a collision-resistant hash function.
The simulator sets pk0 = A and pk1 = B and assigns the
∗
0
0
Waters hash generators parameters u0 = B p−k m+x g y and
ui = B xi g yi . The simulator forwards pk0 , pk1 and the public
parameters (G, p, e, H, u0 , u1 , · · · , un ) to the adversary. From
the view of the adversary, the distribution of the simulated
public parameters is identical to the real construction.
For ease of analysis we define the following functions where
M̃ is the set of indices i such that mi = 1 when H(M ) =
(m1 , · · · , mn ) :
X
X
xi , and J(M ) = y 0 +
yi .
F (M ) = (p−mk ∗ )+x0 +
i∈M̃

i∈M̃

Thus we have the equation
Y
u0
ui = B F (M ) g J(M ) .
i∈M̃

We also define a binary function K(M ) as

K(M ) =

P
0, if x0 + i∈M̃ xi ≡ 0
1, otherwise.

(mod l)

When the adversary issues a signing query on message
M with respect to a ring {g1 , pk1 } where g1 could be pk0
or could be adversarially-generated by the adversary, the
simulator checks whether K(M ) = 0. If so, the simulator
aborts. Otherwise, the simulator chooses a random r ∈ ZZp ,
and computes the signature as
−J(M )
−1
Y
ui )r , S2 = g1F (M ) g r .
S1 = g1F (M ) (u0
i∈M̃
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Let r̃ = r −

α
F (M )

and g1 = g α . Then we have

−J(M )

S1

= g1F (M ) (u0

Y

ui ) r

i∈M̃

−J(M )

= g1F (M ) (B F (M ) g J(M ) )r
α

= B α (B F (M ) g J(M ) )− F (M ) (B F (M ) g J(M ) )r
Y
α
= B α (u0
ui )r− F (M )
i∈M̃
Y
= B α (u0
ui )r̃
i∈M̃

Additionally, we have
−1

α

S2 = g1F (M ) g r = g r− F (M ) = g r̃ .
The simulator will be able to perform this computation if
and only if F (M ) 6= 0 mod p. Finally the adversary outputs
a signature (S1∗ , S2∗ ) on a message M ∗ with respect to the
target ring {pk0 , pk1 }. Due to the collision-resistant property
of the hash function, H(M ∗ ) 6= H(M ) for any message M
that had been submitted to the signing query before. Let M̃ ∗
be the set of indices i P
such that m∗i = 1 where H(M ∗ ) =
0
∗
∗
(m1 , · · · , mn ). If x + i∈M˜∗ xi = k ∗ l, then we have
Qn
m∗
e(A, B)e(S2∗ , u0 j=1 uj j )
S1∗
P
, g) =
e( ∗ y+P
˜∗ yi
i∈M
(S2 )
e((S2∗ )y+ i∈M˜∗ yi , g)
= e(A, B).
Therefore the simulator can solve the CDH problem by
computing g ab as
g ab =

S1∗
P

(S2∗ )y+

˜∗
i∈M

yi

.

Similar to [26], the probability that the simulator does not
abort
the signing oracle and the equation x0 +
P when simulating
1
∗
i∈M˜∗ xi = k l holds is at least λ = 8(n+1)q , which is nonnegligible. This completes the proof.
2
B. Separating Restricted Adaptive Model from ChosenSubring Model
For completeness, we also study the relations between our
restricted adaptive model and existing ring signature models.
Specifically, we further show that, for 2-user ring signatures
satisfying basic anonymity, our model is strictly stronger
than the existing model unforgeability against chosen-subring
attacks [23] reviewed below.
Let RS = (KG, Sig, Ver) be a ring signature scheme. The
model unforgeability against chosen-subring attacks in 2-user
setting is defined by the following experiment:
n(k)
1) Key pairs {pki , ski }i=1 are generated by RS.KG(1k )
where n(·) is a polynomial, and the set of public keys
n(k)
R := {pki }i=1 is given to an adversary A.
2) A is provided with a ring signing oracle OSign(·, ·, ·),
where OSign(s, m, S) outputs RS.Sig(sks , m, S), and
we require that |S| = 2, S ⊂ R and pks ∈ S.
3) A outputs (m∗ , R∗ , σ ∗ ) where |R∗ | = 2, and succeeds
if R∗ ⊂ R, RS.Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , R∗ ) = >, and A had not
queried (·, m∗ , R∗ ) to the ring signing oracle.

A ring signature scheme is said to be (existentially) unforgeable against chosen-subring attacks in the 2-user setting
if there is no adversary wins the above experiment with nonnegligible probability.
We emphasize that, for a ring signature satisfying basic
anonymity, by a hybrid argument, the above model is in fact
equivalent to a model in which A is only given the set of
two public keys R := {pk1 , pk2 }, all the ring signing queries
should be queried with respect to the challenge ring R, and
the final forgery of a ring signature should be with respect to
the same ring R.
On the one hand, it is not hard to see that if a ring signature
is unforgeable against chosen-subring attacks in the 2-user
setting, it is unforgeable in the model when n(k) = 2, as the
adversary in the experiment of unforgeable against chosensubring attacks is provided with more resources.
On the other hand, we show below existence of an adversary
A that succeeds in the experiment of unforgeable against
chosen-subring attacks implies existence of an adversary A0
that succeeds in the experiment when n(k) = 2. Recall that
A0 is given R := {pk1 , pk2 } and its goal is to output a ring
signature with respect to the challenge ring R. A0 generates
n(k)
key pairs {pki , ski }i=3 by running RS.KG(1k ) respectively
n(k)
where n(·) is a polynomial. A0 forwards R0 := {pki }i=1 to
the adversary A and answers A’s queries. Remember that A
makes signing queries with respect to tuples (s, m, S) where
|S| = 2, S ⊂ R0 and pks ∈ S. If S = R, A0 submits the
query (s, m, R) to its own oracle and forwards the reply to A.
If s 6∈ {1, 2}, A0 can generates a ring signature σ using the
secret key sks and forwards σ to A. If S = {pks , pkj } 6= R
but s ∈ {1, 2}, A0 generates a ring signature σ using the
secret key skj and forwards σ to A. Guaranteed by the basic
anonymity property of ring signatures, the replies simulated by
A0 are indistinguishable from the real ones. Finally A outputs
a ring signature tuple (m∗ , R∗ , σ ∗ ) where |R∗ | = 2. Since the
n(k)
key pairs R0 := {pki }i=1 have the same distribution, with
non-negligible probability it will be the case R∗ = R. That
is to say, the adversary A0 can succeed with non-negligible
probability by outputting (m∗ , σ ∗ ).
For 2-user ring signatures with basic anonymity, the argument that unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks is
a stronger model than unforgeability against chosen-subring
attacks follows from the following two claims.
Claim 1: If a 2-user ring signature scheme achieves basic
anonymity and is unforgeable against restricted adaptive attacks, then it is unforgeable against chosen-subring attacks.
Proof of the claim is straightforward, since, guaranteed by
the basic anonymity property, any ring signature queries in the
chosen-subring model with respect to the signing key sk0 can
be simulated by the adversary in the restricted adaptive model
by generating a ring signature using secret key sk1 .
2
Claim 2: If there exists a 2-user ring signature scheme which
achieves basic anonymity and is unforgeable against chosensubring attacks, then there exists a scheme which achieves
basic anonymity, but is not unforgeable against restricted
adaptive attacks.
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Proof. Let RS = (KG, Sig, Ver) be a ring signature scheme
satisfying the conditions stated in the claim. Construct the
following scheme RS0 from RS as follows.
0 k
• KG (1 ): Randomly pick a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and run
(sk, pk) ← KG(1k ). Output pk 0 = b||pk and sk 0 = sk.
0
• Sig (skd , m, S): On input a message m, a 2-user set
S := {b0 ||pk0 , b1 ||pk1 }, and a secret key skd which is
the corresponding secret key of bd ||pkd where d ∈ {0, 1},
if b0 = b1 , it outputs σ ← Sig(skd , m, S̄) where S̄ :=
{pk0 , pk1 }; otherwise, it outputs σ ← Sig(skd , m̄, S̄),
where m̄ is the complementary message of m, i.e. m̄
and m are of the same bit-length but each i-th bit of
them are different.
0
• Ver (m, σ, S): On input a message m, a ring signature σ,
and a 2-user set S := {b0 ||pk0 , b1 ||pk1 }, if b0 = b1 , it
outputs Ver(m, σ, S̄) where S̄ := {pk0 , pk1 }; otherwise,
it outputs Ver(m̄, σ, S̄) where m̄ is the complementary
message of m.
Clearly, the above scheme RS0 still achieves basic
anonymity. It is also not difficult to see that it remains
unforgeable against chosen-subring attacks. However, it is not
unforgeable against restricted adaptive attacks, since given a
challenge ring R := {b0 ||pk0 , b1 ||pk1 }, the adversary can
always asks a query on message m with respect to a ring
R0 := {b00 ||pk0 , b1 ||pk1 } where b00 = 1 − b0 . In this case,
the adversary can easily forge a ring signature on message m̄
with respect to the challenge ring R where message m̄ is the
complementary message of m.
2
Based on the above analysis, the security guaranteed by
our restricted adaptive model lies between of the securities
guaranteed by unforgeability against chosen-subring attacks
and unforgeability under an adaptive attack, against a static
adversary.
IV. R EVIEW OF O PTIMISTIC FAIR E XCHANGE
In this section, we review the definition of optimistic fair
exchange, and Huang et al.’s generic construction of OFE
schemes based on conventional signatures and ring signatures.
Definition 2: A non-interactive optimistic fair exchange
scheme involves the users (signers and verifiers) and the
arbitrator, and is formalized by the following (probabilistic)
polynomial-time algorithms:
TTP
• Setup
: On input 1k , the algorithm generates a secret
key ASK, and a public key APK for the arbitrator.
User
• Setup
: On input 1k and (optionally) APK, it outputs
a secret key SK and a public key PK. For a user Ui , we
use (SKi , PKi ) to denote the user’s key pair.
• Sig and Ver: These are similar to conventional signing
and verification algorithms of an ordinary digital signature scheme. Sig(m, SKi , APK), outputs a full signature1
σ of Ui ’s on message m, while Ver(m, σ, PKi , APK)
outputs > or ⊥, indicating σ is a valid full signature of
Ui ’s on m or not.
1 In

OFE, full signatures are the signatures that the exchanging parties intend
to exchange and they represent the digital services the parties provide. We use
this terminology to distinguish them from signatures generated by ordinary
signature schemes.

PSig and PVer: These are partial signing and verification algorithms respectively. PSig(m, SKi , APK) outputs
a partial signature σP , while PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK)
outputs > or ⊥.
• Res: This is the resolution algorithm run by the arbitrator.
Res(m, σP , ASK, PKi ) outputs a full signature σ, or ⊥
indicating the failure of resolving a partial signature.
Correctness property states that
• Ver(m, Sig(m, SKi , APK), PKi , APK) = >,
PVer(m, PSig(m, SKi , APK), PKi , APK) = >, and
Ver(m, Res(m, PSig(m, SKi , APK), ASK, PKi ), PKi ,
APK) = >.
Resolution ambiguity property states that any “resolved signature” Res(m, PSig(m, SKi , APK), ASK, PKi ) is computationally indistinguishable from an “actual signature” Sig(m,
SKi , APK).
•

A. Security in Multi-User setting and Chosen-key Model
The security of an optimistic fair exchange scheme comprises
three aspects: security against signers, security against verifiers, and security against the arbitrator. Below we review
the security in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model
proposed in [20]. Note that in the following experiments,
the adversary can make queries to the resolution oracle with
respect to adversarially chosen public keys without knowing
the corresponding secret keys.
SECURITY AGAINST SIGNERS. We require that the probability that any PPT adversary A succeeds in the following
experiment is negligible in k.
SetupTTP (1k )
∗

(m, σP , PK )

→

(ASK, APK)

←

AORes (APK)

Res(m, σP , ASK, PK∗ )


PVer(m, σP , PK∗ , APK) = >
success of A :=
∧
Ver(m, σ, PK∗ , APK) = ⊥
σ

←

where the resolution oracle ORes takes as input a valid partial
signature σP on message m under the public key PKi (i.e.
(m, σP , PKi ) such that PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK) = >), and
outputs a full signature σ on m under P Ki . In other words, the
signer should not be able to produce a valid partial signature
such that it cannot be converted to a full signature by the
honest arbitrator.
SECURITY AGAINST VERIFIERS. We require that the
probability that any PPT adversary A succeeds in the following
experiment is negligible in k.
SetupTTP (1k )
User

Setup

k

(1 )

(m, σ)
success of A

→

(ASK, APK)

→

(SK, PK)

AOPSig ,ORes (PK, APK)


Ver(m, σ, PK, APK) = >
:=
∧
(m, ·, PK) 6∈ Query(A, ORes )
←

where oracle ORes is described in the experiment of security
against signers, Query(A, ORes ) is the set of queries made by
A to oracle ORes , and the partial signing oracle OPSig takes as
input a message m and outputs a partial signature σP on m
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under the challenge public key PK. In other words, the verifier
himself should not be able to convert a partial signature σP
into a full signature. Note that there is no need to provide A
with the signing oracle, since it can be simulated by OPSig and
ORes .
SECURITY AGAINST THE ARBITRATOR. We require that
the probability that any PPT adversary A succeeds in the
following experiment is negligible in k.
SetupUser (1k )

→

(SK, PK)

(ST, APK)

←

A(PK)

(m, σ)
success of A

AOPSig (ST, APK, PK)


Ver(m, σ, PK, APK) = >
:=
∧
m 6∈ Query(A, OPSig )
←

where ST is A’s state information, which might not be the
corresponding private key of APK (may contain some random
coins used in the arbitrator’s key pair generation process),
oracle OPSig is described in the previous experiment, and
Query(A, OPSig ) is the set of queries made by A to oracle
OPSig . In other words, the arbitrator should not be able to
produce a full signature on behalf of the signer, unless the
signer has generated a partial one.
Note that all the previous OFE security models do not
consider the security notion of strong-unforgeability which
further guarantees that an adversary cannot produce a new
signature on some message that has been signed before. While
strong-unforgeability is more desirable as it guarantees higher
security, the standard notion of unforgeability appears to be
sufficient for a number of applications of OFE. For instance,
in the scenario of contract signing, a number of the signer’s
signatures on the same contract only mean that the signer has
committed herself to the contract, and a single signature of the
signer’s would be sufficient to show this. Thus in this work
we follow the tradition of OFE and focus on unforgeability,
which makes the presentation more general.
We also make the remark that in order to guarantee fairness
for the signer, the verifier has to make a proof that he has
fulfilled his own obligation to the signer when he submits a
resolution request to the arbitrator. Similar to previous papers
[4], [18], how this is done is not formally considered in Huang
et al.’s chosen-key model as this is application-specific. As
suggested in [13], this issue can normally be addressed in
practice by including an enforcing resolution policy γ inside
the message, which states that in the resolution process the
verifier has to send its own digital item (signature for instance)
to the arbitrator. After the resolution, the arbitrator will send
the verifier’s digital item to the signer to ensure both parties
will gain the other’s digital item.
B. Generic Construction based on ring signatures
Huang et al. [20] showed that optimistic fair exchange
schemes secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model
could be constructed based on conventional signatures and
ring signatures. We briefly review some intuitions of the
construction here.

Let SIG = (KG, Sig, Ver) be a conventional signature
scheme, and RS = (KG, Sig, Ver) be a ring signature scheme.
Each signer has a key pair for SIG and a key pair for RS. The
arbitrator has only a key pair for RS. A partial signature in the
OFE scheme will be a conventional signature generated using
SIG, and a full signature is the partial signature together with a
ring signature generated using RS with the ring members being
the signer and the arbitrator. To resolve a partial signature, the
arbitrator simply uses its secret key to produce a ring signature.
Below are the details of Huang et al.’s generic construction
of OFE.
•

•

SetupTTP : The arbitrator runs (ask, apk) ← RS.KG(1k )
and sets (ASK, APK) := (ask, apk).
ˆ i , pk
ˆ ) ← SIG.KG(1k )
SetupUser : Each user Ui runs (sk
i
k
¯
¯
and (sk i , pk i ) ← RS.KG(1 ), respectively. For a user Ui ,
ˆ i , sk
¯ i ), (pk
ˆ , pk
¯ )).
we set (SKi , PKi ) := ((sk
i
i

•

Sig: The signer Ui first produces a conventional signature σ 0 on message m as the partial signature, i.e.
ˆ i , m), and then generates a ring sigσ 0 ← SIG.Sig(sk
nature on m and its public key PKi , i.e., σ RS ←
¯ i , m||PKi , R)2 where R := {pk
¯ , apk}. The
RS.Sig(sk
i
0
RS
full signature is then set as σ := (σ , σ ).

•

Ver: On input a message m and a signature σ with respect
to signer Ui ’s public key PKi , where σ = (σ 0 , σ RS ), the
verifier checks the validity of σ 0 and σ RS by running
ˆ ) and RS.Ver(m||PKi , σ RS , R) respecSIG.Ver(m, σ 0 , pk
i
¯ , apk}. If both output >, it returns
tively, where R := {pk
i
> indicating accept; otherwise, it returns ⊥ indicating
reject.

•

PSig: The signer Ui computes a conventional signature
ˆ i , m), and returns
σ 0 on message m, i.e. σ 0 ← SIG.Sig(sk
0
σ as the partial signature.

•

•

PVer: On input a message m and a partial signature σ 0
with respect to signer Ui ’s public key PKi , the verifier
ˆ ).
returns SIG.Ver(m, σ 0 , pk
i
Res: On input a message m and a partial signature
σ 0 with respect to a user Ui ’s public key PKi , the
arbitrator first checks the validity of σ 0 by running
ˆ ). If σ 0 is invalid, it returns ⊥; otherSIG.Ver(m, σ 0 , pk
i
wise, it computes σ RS ← RS.Sig(ask, m||PKi , R), where
¯ , apk}. The arbitrator returns σ := (σ 0 , σ RS ).
R := {pk
i

Note that even though the partial signature σ 0 itself is a
valid conventional signature, we cannot view it as the full
signature of the signer. The signer’s full commitment to a
message consists of a conventional signature σ 0 together with a
ring signature σ RS while the ring comprises the signer and the
arbitrator. Correctness of the construction follows from that of
SIG and RS, and resolution ambiguity property follows from
the anonymity requirement of RS.
2 In Huang et al.’s construction, the ring signature is computed on m, σ 0
¯ i , m||σ 0 ||PKi , R). We will later show that
and PKi , i.e., σ RS ← RS.Sig(sk
the security of the generic construction is still preserved even if we sign on
m||PKi rather than m||σ 0 ||PKi .
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V. S ECURITY OF THE G ENERIC C ONSTRUCTION

VI. A NEW EFFICIENT OFE SCHEME

In [20], Huang et al. have proved that the above generic
construction of OFE is secure in the multi-user setting and
chosen-key model, provided that SIG is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks and RS is a
secure ring signature scheme that has basic anonymity and
existential unforgeability under an adaptive attack, against a
static adversary in the 2-user setting.
Here we will show that the construction is still secure if
we adopt a ring signature scheme that is secure in our weaker
model, i.e., unforgeable against restricted adaptive attacks.
Theorem 2: The generic construction of the optimistic
fair exchange scheme is secure in the multi-user setting and
chosen-key model, if SIG is existentially unforgeable against
chosen message attacks and RS is a secure ring signature
scheme that is existential unforgeable against restricted adaptive attacks.
Proof. Theorem 2 follows from the following lemmas.
2
Lemma 1: The generic construction of the optimistic fair
exchange scheme is unconditionally secure against signers.
Proof. Obviously, for any message m and any valid signature
ˆ , the arbitrator can
σ 0 on m under the verification key pk
i
always produce a ring signature σ RS on m||PKi using its
¯ , apk}. Therefore,
own secret key, under the ring R := {pk
i
no adversary can win the game.
2
Lemma 2: The generic construction of the optimistic fair exchange scheme is secure against verifiers if RS is unforgeable
against restricted adaptive attacks.
Proof. Suppose that an adversary A breaks the security against
verifiers. We show how to construct an algorithm B that breaks
the unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks.
Given two public keys pk0 and pk1 , which are challenge
ˆ pk)
ˆ of SIG
public keys, B randomly generates a key pair (sk,
ˆ pk)
ˆ ← SIG.KG(1k ), and sets APK := pk1 and
by running (sk,
ˆ pk0 ). It then runs A as a subroutine with input
PK := (pk,
(PK, APK).
When A makes a partial signing query m to oracle OPSig ,
ˆ m) to A. When A makes
B computes and returns SIG.Sig(sk,
0
0
ˆ 0 , pk
¯ 0 ) to
a resolution query (m, σ , PKi ) where PK0i := (pk
i
i
0
0
oracle ORes , B checks whether PVer(m, σ , PKi , APK) = >.
¯ 0,
If not, B returns ⊥ to A. Otherwise, B submits (m||PK0i , {pk
i
RS
pk1 }) to its own ring signing oracle. Let the reply be σ , B
forwards (σ 0 , σ RS ) to A.
The simulation is perfect. Finally, A outputs its forgery
(m̃, σ̃), where σ̃ = (σ̃ 0 , σ̃ RS ). Thus we have RS.Ver(m̃||PK,
σ̃ RS , R) = > where R := {pk0 , pk1 }. Since (m̃, ·,
PK) 6∈ Query(A, ORes ), B has never issued a query (m̃||PK,
{·, pk1 }) to its own ring signing oracle. Therefore σ̃ RS is a
valid ring signature on a new message m̃||PK under the ring
{pk0 , pk1 }. B can simply output (m̃||PK, σ̃ RS ) and break the
existential unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks. 2
Lemma 3: The generic construction of the optimistic fair
exchange scheme is secure against the arbitrator if SIG is
unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks.
Proof. Since this proof only relies on the property of the
conventional signature scheme SIG, the proof is the same as
that in [20]. Here we will just omit it.
2

In the following, we provide an OFE instantiation to
demonstrate the significance of the generic construction when
adopting a ring signature scheme that is unforgeable against
restricted adaptive attacks. We will use Water’s signature
scheme [26] as SIG and the modified Bender-Katz-Morselli
ring signature (in Section III-A) as RS.
Global Setup : On input 1k where k is a security parameter,
the setup algorithm generates a multiplicative cyclic group G
of prime order p and a bilinear pairing e : G×G → GT where
GT is a multiplicative group of order p. Let g be a generator
of G. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a collision-resistant
hash function. The setup algorithm picks independently and
uniformly at random Waters hash generators u0 , u1 , · · · ,
un ← G. The public public parameters shared by all users
are set as (G, p, e, H, u0 , u1 , · · · , un ).
After the global setup is finished, the algorithms in OFE can
be executed as follows.
SetupTTP : The TTP chooses exponents y ← ZZp and sets Y =
g y . APK is set as Y . ASK is set as y.
SetupUser : User Ui randomly and independently chooses two
exponents xi , x0i ← ZZp , a generator gi ← G, a set of Waters
hash generators u0i , ui,1 , ui,2 , · · · , ui,n ← G and parses SKi =
x0
(xi , x0i ). It computes Xi = g xi , Xi0 = gi i and sets PKi =
(Xi , Xi0 , gi , u0i , ui,1 , ui,2 , · · · , ui,n ).
PSig(M, SKi , APK): It computes (m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H(M ),
chooses r ← ZZp , and computes
S1 = gi xi · (u0i

n
Y

m

ui,jj )r , and S2 = gi r .

j=1

The partial signature is set as σP = (S1 , S2 ).
PVer(M , σP , PKi , APK): It verifies
e(gi , Xi ) = e(S1 , g) · e(S2−1 , u0i

n
Y

m

ui,jj ).

j=1

If so, returns >; otherwise it returns ⊥.
Sig(M, SKi , APK): It computes σP ← PSig(M, SKi , APK)
and (m01 , · · · , m0n ) ← H(M ||PKi ). It then chooses r0 ← ZZp
and computes
0

S10 = APKxi · (u0

n
Y

m0

0

0

uj j )r , and S20 = g r .

j=1

The full signature is set as σ = (σP , S10 , S20 ).
Ver(M, σP , PKi , AP K): It verifies whether PVer(M , σP ,
PKi , APK) = > and whether
e(APK, Xi0 ) = e(S10 , g) · e(S20−1 , u0

n
Y

m0

uj j ).

j=1

If both hold, it returns >; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Res(M, σP , ASK, PKi ): It first verifies whether σP is a valid
partial signature by running PVer(M, σP , PKi , APK). If σP is

9

invalid, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, it computes (m01 , · · · , m0n ) ←
H(M ||PKi ), chooses r0 ← ZZp , computes
S10 = (Xi0 )y · (u0

n
Y

m

0

0

uj j )r , and S20 = g r ,

j=1

(σP , S10 , S20 ).

and returns σ =
Since the securities of both Waters’ signature scheme and
that of the modified Bender-Katz-Morselli ring signature are
based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, our
instantiation is secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman
assumption [25], a well-established assumption on which
many cryptographic primitives are based.
A. Comparison
There are only three efficient OFE schemes that are known
to be secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model
without random oracles. They are the three instantiations
proposed by Huang et al. based on their generic construction.
Instantiation I1 uses Waters’ signature scheme [26] as SIG
and Shacham-Waters’s ring signature scheme [27] as RS. The
security is based on sub-group decision assumption [27], [28]
and computational Diffie-Hellman assumption [25]. Instantiation I2 employs Boneh-Boyen’s weakly secure signature
scheme [29] plus a one-time signature scheme as SIG, and
Chandran-Groth-Sahai ring signature scheme [30] as RS. The
security follows from a stronger assumption, i.e., strong DiffieHellman assumption [29], [30].
In these two instantiations, each user has two key pairs, one
for the conventional signature and the other one for ring signature. To make the instantiations more practical and efficient,
it may be more desirable to combine the two key pairs into
one. Thus in Instantiation I3 , Boyen’s ring signature [24]
(or, say, his mesh signature) is employed. In Boyen’s ring
signature scheme, each user owns a single key pair, and the
adversary can ask not only ring signature queries, but also
atomic (or conventional) signature queries. The security is
based on Poly Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption introduced
by Boyen [24], which is a stronger variant of the Strong DiffieHellman assumption.
Compared with the three instantiations suggested by Huang
et al., our instantiation has the advantage of relying on simpler
assumption.
As a side note, the most efficient scheme in the random oracle model is based on the verifiably-encrypted signature [15]
and secure in the single-user setting under the CDH assumption. Next we compare the performance of our instantiation
with Huang et al.’s three instantiations and the most efficient
OFE scheme in the random oracle model (we call it BGLS
scheme). Since pairing and exponentiation operations take
more time than multiplication operations do, we will simply
ignore the costs of multiplication computations and hash
evaluations. Besides, the calculations that can be done offline are not counted in the evaluation of the performances
of the schemes. Let “E” denote an exponentiation operation,
and “P” denote a pairing operation. By “OFE.Sig elements”,
“OFE.Sig costs” and “OFE.Ver costs”, we mean the number
of group elements of a full signature, the cost of generating

Schemes:
I1
I2
I3
BGLS
Ours

OFE.Sig elements
8
10
8
1
4

OFE.Sig costs
7E
12E
10E
1E
4E

OFE.Ver costs
8P
9P
8E + 4P
2P
4P

TABLE I
P ERFORMANCE C OMPARISON

a full signature, and the cost of verifying a full signature, respectively. The table I summarizes the performances of Huang
et al.’s instantiations, BGLS scheme, and our instantiation.
From the table, it is clear that, compared with Huang et al.’s
instantiations, our instantiation saves almost 50% or even more
of the costs in both generating a full signature and verifying a
full signature. Besides, the number of group elements of the
full signature in our instantiation is only half of those in Huang
et al.’s instantiations. It should also be noted that Instantiation
I1 requires the use of composite order groups equipped with
a bilinear map, which is known to be less efficient compared
with prime-order groups equipped with bilinear map.
For the generation and verification of a partial signature of
BGLS scheme, the cost are 3 exponentiations and 3 pairing
operations, respectively. The partial signature size of BGLS
scheme is 2 group elements. On the contrary, the costs for
generating and verifying a partial signature of our scheme are
2 exponentiations and 2 pairing operations, respectively. The
partial signature size of our scheme is 2 group elements. It is
fair to say our construction performs comparably to the most
efficient scheme secure in the random oracle model.
VII. C ONCLUSION
It is well-known that efficient optimistic fair exchange
schemes without random oracles can be built from conventional signatures and ring signatures. To guarantee the resulting
OFE scheme’s security in the multi-user setting and chosenkey model, it was previously believed that the ring signature scheme should be unforgeable under an adaptive attack,
against a static adversary in the 2-user setting. In this paper,
we proposed a new weaker model for ring signatures named
“unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks”, and proved
that a 2-User ring signature secure in our weaker model was
sufficient to guarantee the resulting OFE scheme’s security.
This observation makes it feasible to construct more efficient
OFE schemes whose security relies on a weaker assumption.
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